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Abstract. Post-communist transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe were 
generally accompanied by an increase of the share of citizens who do not vote. Absentees 
are  usually  persons  who  do  not  feel  close  to  and  do  not  identify  themselves  with  any 
political party. The paper builds a typology of voters/non-voters and then examines the 
changing  patterns  of  electoral  behavior  in  Romania  using  statistical  analysis  based  on 
survey data from 1990 to 2008. In the last 20 year of democratic reconstruction in Romania, 
we can notice a general decline of turnout in parliamentary elections and, in this context, a 
relative increase of the weight of pragmatic-individualist voters and a subsequent decrease 
of the relative share of party loyalists in the total share of voters. This raises questions 
about the credibility of the Romanian political parties and their ability to retain voters from 
one  election  round  to  another.  Moreover,  there  are  significant  attitudinal  and  socio-
demographic differences between partisan and non-partisan voters, on the one hand, and 
between  voters  and  absentees,  on  the  other  hand.  Finally,  the  paper  reconsiders  the 
conceptions and applicability of partisanship in the changing context of elections and voting 
behaviors in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
The quality and inclusiveness of democratic systems is often evaluated in 
terms  of  degree  and  forms  of  citizens’  political  involvement.  Thus,  political 
participation  is  considered  a  key  indicator  for  evaluating  the  functioning  of 
representative  democracies  (Norris,  2002;  Verba,  Schlozman,  &  Brady,  1995). 
Although electoral participation is not the only way citizens can make their voice  
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heard in the political sphere, voting in elections is perhaps the most important 
source  of  legitimacy  in  modern  democratic  governance  (Johann,  2012;  Tătar, 
2011c). A high turnout in elections for a relatively long period is associated in most 
of  the  stable  democracies  with  civism  and  identification  with  the  democratic 
system. This interpretation has normatively prevailed in some democracies, so they 
have legally regulated the obligation to vote in elections (Kaase, 2007).  
Despite theoretical and normative expectations of higher participation in 
democratizing societies, the post-communist context of Central and Eastern Europe 
is characterized by a widespread estrangement of citizens from politics and public 
sphere (Howard, 2003; Letki, 2003). The generalized participatory decline affects 
both  electoral  (Kostadinova,  2003; Kostadinova  &  Power,  2007;  Kostelka, 2010; 
Rose & Munro, 2003) and non-electoral forms of citizens’ political involvement in 
the region (Barnes & Simon, 1998, apud. Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). Romania 
remarkably portrays the declining regional trend of political engagement, as this 
country is one of the former communist block’s states with the sharpest decreases 
in  participation  rates  after  1989.  Moreover,  in  terms  of  political  attitudes,  the 
Romanians  have  experienced  increased  political  disaffection  during  the  post-
communist transition period (Tătar, 2011b). The most obvious symptoms of the 
political  alienation  of  a  significant  part  of  the  Romanian  citizenry
1  include: a 
growing distrust of political institutions and politicians, political cynicisms
2, and a 
sense of personal inefficacy in politics (inability to influence decision -making). All 
these attitudes point to people’s perception of a widening gap between political 
elites  and  citizens,  which  constitutes  a  negative  premise  for  the  subsequent 
engagement in the democratic political process. 
This  paper  analyzes  electoral  behavior  in  post-communist  Romania 
focusing especially on the nexus between party identification and the decision to 
vote or not. I differentiate between partisan voters (those that express closeness to 
a political party) and non-partisan or pragmatic (individualist) voters, and I compare 
the  two  categories  with  non-voters.  Thus,  the  study  will  address  the  following 
research  questions:  What  are  the  main  trends  of  electoral  participation  and 
                                                           
1 For instance, Tufiș (2010, p. 51) estimates that around one third of the Romanian adult 
population ”(self)exiled” itself from the political sphere.   
2 Political cynicism is understood here as a negative sentiment towards the political process 
which is perceived to corrupt the persons who participate in it . Consequently, the cynics 
believe that political processes draw into politics only those persons who are corrupt or want 
to get rich by any means.                        
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partisanship in post-communist Romania? How can these dynamics be explained? 
How  has  the  emigration  of  the  Romanian  workers  influenced  turnout  in 
parliamentary elections? What are the differences between voters and non-voters? 
Are partisan voters more politically sophisticated than pragmatic voters? The data 
used for answering these research questions come both from official statistics and 
reports and several national and international survey datasets from 1990 to 2009, 
representative for the adult population of Romania. 
 The  paper  is  structured  into  six  parts.  Fist,  I  will  critically  review  the 
literature  on  the  nexus  between  electoral  behavior  and  partisanship.  Then  I  will 
briefly present the data and methods used for answering the research questions. In 
the  following  section  I  compare  the  dynamics  of  turnout  in  elections  and  the 
evolution of partisanship in Romania, after 1989. Afterwards, I construct a typology 
of the Romanian electorate based on voting behavior and partisanship. Next, I will 
examine the attitudinal and socio-demographic characteristics of different types of 
voters/non-voters. In the concluding section, I will summarize the main findings and 
discuss their theoretical implications. 
     
The electoral behavior – partisanship nexus: An overview 
 
The declining political engagement of Romanians during the post communist 
period  was  also  accompanied  by  an  increased  party  dealignment  and  electoral 
volatility from one round of elections to another (Tătar, 2011b). Previous research on 
Western democracies has emphasized that as alignments between parties and voters 
weaken, electoral volatility (that is switches from one party to another) increases 
(Dalton  &  Wattenberg,  2000).  There  are  basically  two  perspectives  on  electoral 
volatility: a pessimistic one and a more optimistic one (Dassonneville, 2012). The 
negative interpretation is that volatile voters are less politically sophisticated, being 
thus  uninformed  and/or  uninterested  about  politics  (Berelson,  1963  apud.  ; 
Dassonneville, 2012), as well as less knowledgeable and aware on how they can 
influence decision-making or why is politics relevant for their life (Cameron, 2009; 
Highton, 2009; Luskin, 1990; McClurg, 2006). On the contrary, other scholars claim 
that volatile voters are more politically sophisticated, as they are highly informed and 
interested in politics and are capable to make their own and meaningful choices 
during  the  elections,  not  relying  solely  on  socio-demographical    predispositions 
(Dassonneville,  2012)  and  partisan  bounds.  According  to  this  positive  view,  
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sophisticated voters switch parties because they are politically pragmatic, meaning 
they are capable of assessing and choosing among different party programs and 
electoral  offers,  those  that  best  fit  or  represent  their  interest.  This  latter 
interpretation rests on the assumption that political sophistication enables citizens to 
connect their values and interests to their political opinions and behaviors and thus 
provides a variety of advantages for those who have this characteristic, compared to 
those  that  do  not  have  it  (Highton,  2009).  Moreover,  political  sophistication  or 
“expertise”  in  Luskin’s  (1990)  terms  is  linked  to  more  political  awareness  and 
engagement (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli 
Carpini, 2006).  
On the other hand, the theoretical and normative relevance of analyzing the 
differences between types of voters and non-voters rests particularly in what Verba 
et  al.  (1995)  call  “participatory  inequalities”  which  can  undermine  democracy  if 
participation in politics is obstructed by structural constraints. Those who participate 
can make their voice heard in the political process and their interests are better 
represented  in  the  political  sphere,  compared  to  those  that  do  not/cannot 
participate. If the factors that hinder the political engagement of different segments 
of citizenry are based on unequal access to participatory resources, then the terms in 
which political participation processes take place in a democracy might not be fair 
(Teorell, 2006) inducing a “participatory bias” based on structural constraints. And 
this compromises the principle of political equality that underlies democracy (Dahl, 
1989; Verba, et al., 1995).  
Participation  inequalities  can  be  explained  by  a  variety  of  individual 
characteristics that are in their turn unequally distributed in society. Above all, early 
electoral studies highlighted party identification (party ID) as one of the most reliable 
predictors of voting in elections. In 1960 the research group of the University of 
Michigan proposed the paradigm of the “captive” voter in a collective book entitled 
The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), which became a 
classic of electoral studies. The authors identified strong and persistent attachments 
of citizens to one of the two major American political parties, which structure the 
American political life. The researchers pointed out that strong partisan identification 
of Americans influenced not only their voting behavior but also most of their political 
attitudes. Moreover, once acquired, party attachments were remarkably durable and 
have generated almost a mechanical reproduction of partisan preferences from one 
generation to another (Baudouin, 1999).                         
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However, during the 1970s analyses began to show a systematic erosion of 
identifications  with  political  parties.  As  a  reaction  to  the  Michigan  group’s 
paradigm, The Changing American Voter (Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976) proposed a 
new model of the “individualist” voter freed from party mechanisms (Baudouin, 
1999). Moreover, the authors of The Changing American Voter find growing party 
dealignments  especially  among  the  younger  age  cohorts,  characterized  by  high 
electoral volatility form one round of election to another, and whose vote is based 
more on issues and persons and less on party identifications.  
Although the concept of party identification can hardly be translated from 
the American context (with two major parties) to the European one (with more 
fragmented and sometimes more volatile multiparty party systems) (Campbell, et 
al., 1960; Holmberg, 2007; Thomassen & Rosema, 2009 apud. Dassonneville, 2012), 
empirical analyses have proved the usefulness of this concept in explaining turnout 
in elections  (Comșa, Gheorghiță, & Tufiș, 2010; Tătar, 2011c; Teodorescu, 2009). 
However, the original claim of the Michigan school that party identification is an 
attitude acquired mainly through socialization during childhood and adolescence is 
less functional in the post-communist context. According to Tufiș (2010) there are 
several relevant aspects regarding the way attachments to political parties might 
crystallize/diminish  in  the  Eastern  European  context.  First,  the  almost 
instantaneous emergence of political parties in post-communist societies excludes 
the formation of attachments to them through political socialization, leaving only 
direct  experience  as  a  possible  source  of  attachment  to  a  political  party.  Thus 
attitudes towards parties are more volatile and vulnerable to critical evaluations of 
their current (mainly economical) performance as parties in government. Second, 
the  initial  post-communist  transition  period  was  characterized  by  an  increased 
instability of the party systems and this did nothing but to delay the formation of 
strong  attachments  to  political  parties.  Third,  due  to  a  high  personalization  of 
politics it is possible that closeness to a specific political party means in fact an 
attachment to the party leader. In this case, identification with a political party 
might easily vanish if the nexus between a particular party and its leader no longer 
exists.  Research  on  partisanship  in  new  democracies  points  out  that  “party 
identification is mainly shaped by political factors, not social variables” (Holmberg, 
2007, p. 566). This means that in post-communist Eastern Europe, partisanship is 
more an evaluative and political concept, an endogenous notion emerging within 
the political processes.  
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Partisanship,  understood  as  attachment  to  political  parties,  can  be 
disentangled into three main aspects (C. D. Tufiș, 2010): a general attachment meaning 
the closeness to a political party; the intensity of attachment taking into account the 
degree  of  identification  with  a  political  party  (i.e.  from  low/weak  to  high/strong 
attachment); a specific attachment to a particular party allowing thus comparisons 
between partisans of different political parties. In this paper I will focus on the former 
aspect mentioned above, namely the general attachment/closeness to any political 
party.  This  research  strategy  is  motivated  first,  by  the  focus  of  this  paper  not  on 
partisanship  per  se  but  on  its  analysis  in  conjunction  with  electoral  behavior,  and 
second, by the necessity to have a more general concept/variable (i.e. low intension, 
high extension) suitable for the constructions of voter/non-voters typologies that allow 
diachronic comparisons using data from different surveys.  
Voters, respectively non-voters can be classified according to several criteria: 
confidence in parties / political leaders, the degree of partisanship (identification / 
closeness to one party or another), voting intentions, etc. (Comșa, 2006). Depending on 
the consistency of participation in elections, one can distinguish between systematic 
voters (always vote), conjectural non-voters (sometimes vote, other times do not vote) 
and systematic non-voters (never or almost never vote). Comşa (2006) estimates the 
size of the conjectural non-voters category to be around 40% of the voting population 
of Romania, containing those who do not vote in certain elections. The percentage of 
those who say they never vote (systematic non-voters) is much lower, estimated by 
Comșa (2006) to about 8%.  
A report commissioned by the European Parliament presents likewise results 
for 'unconditional' abstainers (those who never vote) in the 2009 European elections in 
Romania (European Parliament, 2012). Somewhat similar figures appear in a study 
conducted by the Institute for Public Policy in March 2009 (see Alexandru, Moraru, & 
Ercuş, 2009): 8% of respondents say they never vote in parliamentary elections, and 7% 
say they never vote in the presidential elections. Also 16% reported they rarely vote in 
presidential elections and 12% that rarely vote in presidential elections. Should be 
noted that these estimates are based on the respondents’ statements in post-electoral 
surveys, and the real figures may be significantly higher. 
  Beyond the typologies outlined above, it remains to assess the factors that 
lead  individuals to vote or abstain  in elections. Literature  devoted to participation 
reveals a number of perspectives from which citizen involvement in politics is analyzed. 
The institutionalist approach focuses on the structure of opportunities for participation                       
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offered  by  institutional  channels  and  procedures.  At  the  macro  level,  comparative 
studies reveal significant differences between countries’ institutional setup and degree 
of openness to citizen participation in public affairs. The institutional openness can 
inhibit  or  stimulate  citizens  involvement  (Jackman,  1987;  Powell,  1986).  But  even 
within the same political and institutional system there are often significant differences 
between the degree of participation of the poor and the rich, between young and old, 
between those with higher education and those with primary school (Norris, 2002). 
This direction of analysis  is used by the structural perspectives which emphasize the 
role of social cleavages based on age, gender, social status, which are closely related to 
resources such as time, money, knowledge and skills necessary to participate (Verba, et 
al., 1995). On the other hand, motivational perspectives focus on cultural attitudes and 
values  that  people  have  in  the  processes  of  political  participation,  including  civic 
engagement norms, political interest, ideological and partisan identification, etc. Unlike 
the above perspectives, theories of mobilization highlight the role of agents, either 
taken individually, (such as political leaders), or collectively as the social networks and 
organizations  such  as  political  parties,  trade  unions,  voluntary  organizations  and 
community  associations  that  act  as  catalysts  and  mobilizers  of  participation 
(Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). To summarize, the explanatory models mentioned in 
the literature suggests that individuals do not participate because they cannot, don’t 
want to or simply because nobody asked them to participate (Norris, 2002). 
 
Data and methods 
 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  comes  from  official  statistics  and  reports 
(concerning turnout in elections and emigration of Romanians) and survey datasets. 
The source of data used for analyses are mentioned below each table/figure. In this 
section, I will only briefly present the post-electoral surveys carried out in Romania and 
used in this article: for the elections of 20 May 1990, I used data collected from a 
representative  sample  of  1234  people  in  Romania  in  December  1990  within  the 
international study Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990-
2001. Cumulated Survey Data (Rotman et al, 2004); for the elections of 3 November 
1996, I used data collected in Romania on a sample of 1175 respondents in December 
1996 within the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES Module 1), 1996-2000; 
for  the  elections  of  November  the  28
th,  2004,  I  used  the  second  module  of  the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, Module 2), 2001-2006 conducted in  
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Romania  in  December  2004,  on  a  representative  sample  of  1913  people;  for  the 
parliamentary elections of 30 November 2008, I used data from the European Social 
Survey,  Module  4,  3rd  edition,  (ESS  round  4)  carried  out  in  Romania  between  2 
December 2008 and 19 January 2009 on a representative sample of 2146 respondents. 
In  this  paper,  I  will  use  sample  re-weighting  as  a  method  for  correcting 
distortions  in  survey  data  starting  from  the  assumption  that  voting  in  elections  is 
perceived by individuals as a socially desirable behavior and thus there is a significant 
tendency of over-reporting voting in post-electoral surveys. The method consists of 
differential weighting of individuals in the sample according to their declared voting 
behavior  (those  who  said  they  had  voted,  respectively  had  not  voted  in  the  last 
parliamentary elections) using official aggregated data on turnout as known values of 
the voting population, for each row of parliamentary elections in Romania from 1990 
to 2008. This weighting scheme is based on the following idea underlined by Crow and 
Berumen (2007): a higher weight is given to respondents who admit that they had not 
voted (assuming they tell the truth) and a lower weight is assigned to those who claim 
to have voted (assuming that some of them tell the truth, but a significant portion of 
them falsely stating they had voted)
3. In other words, weighting is a correction of the 
under-representation of the true non-voters in the sample used  (Crow & Berumen, 
2007). The methods of data analysis used in this study consist mainly of descriptive 
statistics, and bivariate statistical analysis.   
 
Electoral participation and emigration: developments in post-communist Romania 
 
In Romania turnout in parliamentary elections has decreased by over 50% in 
the last two decades. While in the first post-communist elections of 1990 over 86% of 
Romanians voted, turnout in the parliamentary elections of 2012 was 41.76%. There 
are multiple factors explaining the decline in voter turnout in parliamentary elections in 
Romania  in  the  last  20  years  (Tătar,  2011c).  Two  of  the  most  prominent  factors 
contributing to decreasing electoral participation are: people’s disaffection with post-
communist politics and the increasing mobility of the Romanian workers abroad. On 
the one hand, the recurrent disappointments of a significant part of the population 
with the post-communist governments reduced the feeling that elections can function 
as a mechanism to produce social transformation (Tătar, 2011c).  
                                                           
3 For a more thorough discussion of the weighting scheme please see Tătar (2011b, pp. 114-
118, pp. 119-120; 2011c)                       
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Figure 1: Declining turnout in Romanian parliamentary elections 1990-2012 
 
Source:  own  elaboration  based  on  data  available  on  the  websites  of  the  Central  Electoral 
Commission for the Romanian parliamentary elections, from 1990 to 2012. 
 
Another  important  factor  explaining  the  sharp  decline  in  electoral 
participation is the increasing stock of Romanians working abroad (see Figure 2). A 
report  on  labor  mobility  carried  out  on  behalf  of  the  European  Commission 
estimates the number of Romanian citizens in the EU15 countries to be above 2 
million persons, most of whom have worked in Italy, Spain and Germany in 2009 
(Holland, Fic, Rincon-Aznar, Stokes, & Paluchowski, 2011). However, other studies, 
using  both official  data  and  public  opinion surveys  carried out  in  Romania and 
abroad, estimate the number of Romanians working and living abroad (not only in 
EU15) to be around 3 millions (Abraham & Şufaru, 2009). Citizens working abroad 
and having valid Romanian identity documents are automatically enrolled in the 
electoral lists containing the voting population of Romania. However, out of these 
2-3 millions of Romanians working abroad, less than half a million (441,769) had 
permanent  residence  in  their  host  country  and  consequently  the  right  to  vote 
abroad  for the  Romanian  parliamentary  elections of  2012,  according  to Mircea 
Dușa,  Minister  of  Administration  and  Interior,  cited  by  the  Romanian  press
4.  If 
these figures are correct, then it means that only between 16 and 25% (depending 
                                                           
4  See  http://www.ziare.com/mircea-dusa/stiri-mircea-dusa/mircea-dusa-441-769-de-romani-
din-strainatate-au-drept-de-vot-1205960, accessed on 12.02.2013. 
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on the estimations) of the Romanian citizens could actually exercise their voting 
rights  while  living  abroad.  Even  for  this  category,  voting  costs  are  quite  high 
because it implied going to the Romanian consulates in the host country where 
polling stations were organized by the Romanian Foreign Ministry. 
 
Figure 2: Increasing stocks of Romanian citizens in EU15 countries, 1997-2009 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Holland, et al. (2011) 
 
Moreover,  for  Romanians  working  abroad  without  having  permanent 
residence in the host country, voting costs (time, money, and so on) are downright 
prohibitive because they should return to Romania in order to vote in their locality 
of residence. In spite of these figures, turnout is calculated as a percentage of those 
who went to the polls of all those who are enrolled in the electoral lists
5. The 
relatively large stock of Romanians working/living abroad and enrol led in the 
electoral lists in Romania, combined with the high “costs” of voting these citizens 
face, significantly lowers the degree of turnout reported by Romanian officials. For 
instance, turnout would have been with 7-8 percentages higher in the Romanian 
parliamentary elections of 2012 if the Romanians working abroad would not have 
been taken into account in calculating the level of turnout. 
                                                           
5 Officially reported turnout (%) = 100* those who went to the polls / those who are enrolled 
in the electoral lists.  
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The urban-rural electoral divide in post-communist Romania 
 
Another relevant variable explaining electoral participation in Romania is 
the place of residence. Urban areas faced a more pronounced turnout decline than 
rural ones (Figure 3). If in the 1996 and 2000 elections urban residents voted in 
higher proportions than those in rural areas, this trend has been reversed since the 
parliamentary elections of 2004 when rural residents went to the polls at a higher 
rate. The parliamentary elections of 2008 consolidated this new trend as in rural 
areas there has been a turnout rate of 43.9%, compared to only 35.7% in urban 
areas. In 2012, voter turnout in urban areas was again lower than in rural areas 
(40.49% to 43.40%). 
 
Figure 3: Turnout in Romanian parliamentary elections 1996-2012: Urban-Rural 
Comparisons   
 
Source: author's elaboration based on data available from Alexandru Moraru & Ercuş (2009), for the 
1996-2008 elections and data available on the website of the Central Electoral Commission, for the 2012 
parliamentary elections, http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro. 
Note: Data refer to turnout in parliamentary elections. 
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The reversing electoral participation trend, so that it became higher in rural 
compared to urban areas, has several potential explanations. During the 1990s, the 
larger urban electoral participation could be the consequence of higher political 
awareness of city dwellers mainly due to easier access to media and especially to 
television  channels
6. In addition, the instability and inconsistency of Romanian 
party system during the 1990s prevented the formation and consolidation of strong 
local party organizations that could penetrate social networks and effectively 
mobilize voters during election campaigns. In the absence of highly politicized local 
mobilizing agents, the dissemination of political messages in election campaigns 
was mainly done through the media (especially television), and urban residents 
were thus advantaged in terms of access to political information. 
The informational advantage of the urban residents diminished gradually 
with the expansion of private cable / satellite television networks in rural areas too. 
In addition, the crystallization and consolidation of the party system after the 
general election of 2000 is accompanied by the formation of genuine electoral fiefs 
at  local  and  county  levels,  having  strong  political  leaders  and  local  party 
organizations that control and repeatedly win elections in certain localities.  
In addition, re -elected mayors for several consecutive  terms acquired 
political experience and increased their capacity to mobilize voters in  local and 
national electoral campaigns. Moreover, the ability to mobilize voters is more 
pronounced in rural areas, since rural communities in Romania are usually smaller 
and  better  ”bounded”  than  urban  ones,  social  and  interpersonal  relations  are 
usually better developed and more dense ("everybody knows everyone"), direct 
contacts between mobilizing entrepreneurs and voters are facile ("door to door" 
electoral campaigns entail lower costs) and the ability to monitor the electoral 
behavior of citizens is higher and hence chances of any sanctions / rewards, for 
those who do not vote / vote in a certain way, are higher
7.  
Therefore, rural localities provide political organizations a better control 
over local electoral contexts and this could be one of the expl anations of the high 
                                                           
6 In the 1990s, the majority of rural residents had limited access to private television stations, 
the most watched in rural areas being the public television station (TVR).  
7 Media repeatedly presented cases where rural localities’ mayors were threatening persons 
with a precarious financial situation that they will no longer receive social benefits provided 
by the municipality if they do not vote as the mayor indicated. Media also covered cases in 
which  some  political  entrepreneurs  offered  illegal  rewards  /  incentives  to  citizens  in 
exchange of a vote for a candidate or political party. Such „electoral bribes” were more 
frequently reported in rural areas, compared to urban ones.                       
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stakes that some political leaders have attributed to electoral competition in rural 
localities after 2000. The political strategy of "conquering" rural areas is closely 
linked to the growing importance given to local elections (winning as many mayor 
positions to politically control and mobilize local communities) as well as to the 
political  migration  of  mayors
8  and the politicization of access to redistributive 
resources (mayors belonging to opposition parties switching to the party in  power 
in return for access to resources). The "battle" for rural areas had also an effect in 
terms of political mobilization for parliamentary elections that later materialized 
both  by  a  higher  rate  of  voter  turnout  and  an  increased  level  of  political 
partisanship in rural areas.   
Regarding the different degrees of participation in local compared to 
parliamentary elections, 2008 is a premiere. For the first time since the fall of 
communism, local elections recorded a significantly higher rate of  participation 
than parliamentary ones: 48.79% versus 39.2%. Turnout in local elections had a 
sinuous evolution over time: decreased from 1992 to 2000, then increased in 2004 
to decrease in 2008 and increase again in 2012. However, over the period analyzed 
here, the losses in terms of turnout in local elections (from about 65% in 1992 to 
56% in 2012) were much lower than in the parliamentary elections (from about 
86% in 1990 to around 41% in 2012). 
Higher rates of participation in local elections in 2008 and  2012 compared 
to the Parliamentary ones could be the outcome of several cumulated trends. 
These  developments  can  be  summarized as:  increased  political  trust  in  local 
institutions  (C.  Tufiș,  2007)  compared  with  the  confidence  in  national  political 
institutions that has dramatically decreased during the early 1990s, and remained 
thereafter  stabilized  at  a  relatively  low  level;  an  increasing  influence  of  local 
political actors in mobilizing voters combined with their direct interest and involved 
in  local  electoral  campaigns  to  win  political  offices;  increased  political  efficacy 
manifested by the perception that citizens can influence local decisions to a greater 
extent than the national ones; increasing coverage of local electoral campaigns 
through the development of local and regional media (Matiuța et al., 2012 apud. ; 
Tătar,  2011b).  The  growing  turnout  in  recent  local  elections  in  Romania  could 
indicate  a  new  trend  of  Romanian  politics.  The  increasing  importance  given  to 
                                                           
8 Political migration of locally elected representatives in Romania was prohibited by law 
under the sanction of losing the mandate, while Romanian MPs can pass from one party to 
another without losing their parliamentary mandate.  
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electing local decision-makers constitutes a ferment that may lay the ground for 
more  profound  changes  in  the  political  life  in  Romania,  to  prepare  for  wider 
decentralization and regionalization processes (Țăranu, 2009). 
 
Partisanship:  dynamics  and  a  typology  of  voters/non-voters  in  post-communist 
Romania 
 
Political partisanship (defined here as feeling closeness to a political party) 
decreases in post-communist Romania in a similar vein as turnout in elections
9 
(Figure 4). If in 1990 partisanship was at relatively high rates both in rural and 
urban areas (around 60%) in the coming years there has been a gradual decline in 
the percentage of those who feel close to a party, decline more pronounced in 
rural areas. Available data show the difference between urban and rural areas to 
peak  in  2004  when  rural  residents  had  a  level of  partisanship  by  about  14 
percentage points lower than those in urban areas.  
 
Figure 4: The evolution of partisanship in urban and rural Romania, 1990-2008 
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on data PCP1 (1990), CSES1 (1996), CSES2 (2004), ESS4 (2008). 
                                                           
9  Individual  level  data  (ESS4  post-electoral  survey)  concerning  voting  in  the  Romanian 
parliamentary elections of 2008 show a statistically significant association between political 
partisanship and turnout [χ2 (1) = 276.54, p <0.001, N = 2089]. Effect size of partisanship on 
turnout (Phi = 0.364) is medium, according to Cohen's (1988) criteria.  
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By  2008,  the  percentage  of  those  who  felt  close  to  a  political  party 
increased  in  rural  areas  by  about  5  percentage  points,  while  in  urban  areas 
continued to decline by nearly 11 percentage points. Given a positive relationship 
between partisanship and voting in elections, increased partisanship in rural zones 
and  a  continued  decline  in  urban  areas  (2004-2008)  is  one  of  the  factors  that 
contributed to the higher voter participation rate in rural compared to urban zones 
in the 2008 parliamentary elections. 
In  this  paper,  citizens  are  classified  by  their  voting  behavior  (voters 
respectively  non-voters)  and  their  partisanship  (feel  close  to  a  party  or  not). 
Combining the two criteria, four categories have yielded (see Table 1): ‘Partisan 
voters’, ‘Pragmatic or individualist voters’, ‘Partisan non-voters’, and ‘Individualist 
non-Voters’. Partisan voters are those who voted in the last elections and feel 
close to at least one political party. Pragmatic voters (non-partisans) are those who 
voted in the last elections but are not close to any political party. Individualist non-
voters are those who do not feel close to any party and did not vote in the last 
elections, while Partisan non-voters are those who feel close to a political party 
even though they did not vote in the last parliamentary elections. 
 
Table 1: A typology of voters/non-voters 
  Voter 
Yes  No 
P
a
r
t
i
s
a
n
s
h
i
p
 
Yes   Partisan Voters  Partisan Non-Voters 
No   Pragmatic Voters  Individualist Non-Voters 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Figure 5 illustrates that in post-communist Romania the share of those who 
do not vote in elections has significantly increased. Non-voters are mostly people 
who do not feel close to any political party – ‘Individualist non-voters’ (from 9.9% in 
1990 to 49.9 % in 2008). In contrast, the category ‘Partisan non-voters’ remains 
relatively constant over time (from 6.1% in 1990, reaching 10.8% in 2008). On the 
other  hand,  the  share  of  voters  diminishes  significantly  in  the  period,  but  the 
sharpest fall is registered within the type of ‘Partisan voters’ (from 57% to 20.6%).  
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The percentage of ‘Pragmatic voters’ also drops but not as dramatically (from 26.9% 
to 18.8%). While in 1990, about two-thirds of those who voted declared themselves 
close to at least one party (partisans), in 2008 only slightly more than half of the 
voters were partisans. In other words, since 1990 the relative weight of ‘Pragmatic 
voters’  has  increased  in  the  total  turnout  in  parliamentary  elections,  while  the 
relative share of ‘Partisans voters’ has decreased. The sharp decrease of the share of 
partisan voters raises questions both about political parties’ electoral credibility and 
their ability to retain voters from one election round to another. Electoral volatility
10 
between elections increased significantly in the transition period of the 1990s. For 
instance the PCP survey (waves 1 and 2) shows that about 91% of those surveyed at 
the end of 1990 kept their vote intention for the party they had voted for in the 
elections of May 1990, while in 1998 only about 74 % said they would vote the same 
party they had voted for in the parliamentary elections held in the fall of 1996.  
 
Figure 5: Changing patterns of voters / non-voters in Romania, 1990-2008 
 
Note: % in columns 
Source: Personal elaboration based on PCP1 (1990), CSES1 (1996), CSES2 (2004), ESS4 (2008). 
                                                           
10  The  fluctuations  of  Romanian  voters'  choices  in  the  transition  period  are  difficult  to 
explain and assess accurately because beyond the personal assessments of citizens ("the party 
I voted for did a good/ bad job") volatility may be the result of systemic factors such as 
increased party  system instability  manifested by the disappearance/appearance of parties, 
mergers/schisms of parties, etc. 
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The spectrum of types of voters / non-voters: how different are they? 
 
How big are the differences between the four types of voters / non-voters 
listed above? Among the items examined in Table 2 it appears that the greatest 
attitudinal  differences  are  among  partisan  voters  and  individualist  non-voters. 
Between these two polar categories shall be placed pragmatic voters and partisan 
non-voters.  Partisan  voters  (about  20%  of  all  citizens  entitled  to  vote  in  the 
parliamentary elections of November 2008) are more interested in politics than the 
general public and also spend more time watching political issues on television. A 
similar profile, in terms of political interest and political information provided by 
television, stands for non-partisan voters (about 10% in the 2008 elections): 35.2% 
watch political news on TV for more than 1 hour and a half daily (compared to 
35.6% of partisans voters), and 52.3% are interested in politics (against 62.7% of 
partisan  voters).  Instead,  pragmatic  voters  and  individualist  non-voters  are  less 
interested in politics and therefore invest less time in getting information about 
politics. 
Partisan voters and non-voters have similar attitudes in terms of political 
interest and the understanding of political issues. However, the two groups differ 
significantly in terms of the trust they have in Parliament and politicians. Trust, or 
better said lack of trust in political actors seems to be one of the key factors that 
determine the individualist non-voters not to go to the polls. Generally, those who 
do  not  vote  tend  not  to  trust  politicians  or  the  institutions  of  representative 
democracy. Individualist non-voters generally mistrust other people (only 21.3% 
tend to trust most people), and this distinguishes them from partisan non-voters 
who are significantly more confident in other persons (31.1% consider that most 
people can be trusted). Also, voters usually have a higher degree of trust than 
individualist non-voters (30.4% of partisan voters and 26.3% of pragmatic voters 
believe they can trust most people). Lack of trust in other people is probably one of 
the factors that prevent non-voters to build those community and interpersonal 
relationships that stimulate greater civic participation. Summarizing, the data in 
Table  2  suggest  that  neither  voters  nor  the  category  of  non-voters  are 
homogeneous, and the decision to participate or not in elections is probably based 
on different determinants for each of the four types of voters/non-voters analyzed 
above. 
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Table 2: The spectrum of voters / non-voters: how different are they? 
 
Partisan 
Voters 
Pragmatic 
Voters 
Individualist 
Non-Voters 
Partisan 
Non-
Voters 
Sample 
Average  
Follow  political 
news on TV more 
than  1  ½  hour 
per day 
35.6  27.7  19.8  35.2  26.3 
Interested  in 
politics 
62.7  39.2  23.3  52.3  37.5 
Politics  is  often 
considered 
complicated 
36.8  39.0  49.9  40.2  44.0 
Finds  it  difficult 
to  decide  on 
political issues 
18.6  25.8  27.8  23.7  25.0 
No trust at all in 
Parliament 
9.9  15.0  24.1  18.3  18.8 
No trust at all in 
politicians  16.2  19.5  32.7  21.8  25.6 
Tend  to  trust 
most people 
30.4  26.3  21.3  31.1  25.2 
Note: Data are % within each category of voters / non-voters who have the above features. All variables 
listed in the table are significantly associated (p <0.01) with the types of voters / non-voters but the 
effect size varies from low to moderate values (Cramer's V coefficient values between 0.083 and 0.331) 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on ESS4, Romania (2008/2009). 
 
How to explain that although some people feel close to a political party 
they tend not to vote ("partisan non-voters")? I believe that the partisan non-vote 
can be interpreted both as a form of expressing dissatisfaction and as a non-voting 
strategy based on a rational calculation. On the one hand, the partisan non-voters 
could be included in the category of those who were somewhat disappointed with 
the performance or decisions taken by certain politicians from the party they feel 
close  to.  On  the  other  hand,  partisan  non-voters  might  consider  the  stakes  of 
elections as being very low and therefore it is not worthy to go to vote or that 
elections  are  not  competitive  and  the  party  they  support  will  win  or  lose  the 
elections  anyway,  with  or  without  their  vote  (i.e.  their  vote  will  not  bring  an 
additional number of parliamentary seats to the party, but it will neither reduce the 
number of seats won) (Tătar, 2011a).                       
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Socio-demographic characteristics of voters/non-voters: who they are? 
 
Beyond particular attitudes and motivations which differentiate the types 
of  voters/non-voters  discussed  above,  they  also  have  some  distinct  socio-
demographic  and  occupational  characteristics.  Table  3  reveals  such  differences 
among voters/non-voters. Thus, men are generally more partisan than women (in 
the sense that they feel in greater proportion close to a party): 24.8% of men are 
partisan voters compared to only 17.4% of women and 11.4% of men are partisan 
non-voters, compared to 10.3% of women. Women tend to be rather part of the 
group of pragmatic voters: 53.3% of women vs. 45.4% of men. 
Both  partisanship  and  the  likelihood  of  voting  increase  with  age.  Older 
people have a greater influence on the outcome of elections precisely because 
turnout in these age cohorts is higher than in younger generations. On the other 
hand, wishing to maximize their vote share, political parties and leaders will likely 
give  more  attention  to  requests  coming  from  groups  of  older  persons,  simply 
because politicians know that the elderly come out to vote in higher proportions 
than younger people. People having between 50-65 years recorded the highest 
proportion  of  partisan  (29.1%)  and  pragmatic  voters  (22.6%)  and  the  lowest 
percentage  of  individualist  non-voters  (38.8%).  Participation  and  partisanship 
register an obvious setback after the age of 65-70 years, a fact revealed by data in 
Table 3. At the other end of the scale of participation and partisanship are young 
people who are less likely to vote, whether or not close to a political party. Thus, 
among persons aged between 18 and 29 years are recorded the fewest partisan 
(11.6%) and pragmatic voters (13.5%). The vast majority of people in this age group 
are non-voters who do not feel close to any party (individualist non-voters 63.8%). 
Married  persons  participate  in  higher  proportions  in  elections,  whether 
they identify or not with a political party: 22.5% of those who  are married are 
partisan  voters,  and  21.1%  are  pragmatic  voters,  compared  to  only  15.5%  of 
unmarried persons who are partisan voters and 15.8% who are pragmatic voters. 
Unmarried people are mostly non-voters who do not feel close to any political 
party  (58.3%).  In  addition,  people  who  have  children  tend  to  be  in  higher 
proportions  partisan  (22.5%)  or  pragmatic  voters  (21.1%)  than  those  without 
children (19.6% are partisan voters and 17.5% pragmatic voters). Just as in the case 
of unmarried individuals, most people without children are part of individualist 
non-voters category.  
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Table 3: Socio-demographic characteristics of the types of voters / non-voters 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Partisan 
Voters 
Pragmatic 
Voters 
Individualist 
Non-Voters 
Partisan 
Non-
Voters 
Total 
Gender           
Male  24.8%  18.3%  45.4%  11.4%  100.0% 
Female  17.4%  19.1%  53.3%  10.3%  100.0% 
Age           
18-29  11.6%  13.5%  63.8%  11.0%  100.0% 
30-49  19.1%  19.3%  48.8%  12.8%  100.0% 
50-65  29.1%  22.6%  38.8%  9.5%  100.0% 
65+  24.7%  20.3%  46.8%  8.2%  100.0% 
Marital status           
Married  24.6%  21.0%  43.3%  11.1%  100.0% 
Unmarried  15.5%  15.8%  58.3%  10.4%  100.0% 
Education 
NS, 
p>0.05 
       
Primary school / 
apprentice 
20.7%  19.9%  47.9%  11.5%  100.0% 
High school / post-
secondary 
20.5%  18.7%  50.8%  10.1%  100.0% 
Graduate / 
postgraduate 
21.6%  15.3%  53.0%  10.1%  100.0% 
Participation in 
religious services 
         
Weekly or more 
often 
26.1%  23.8%  40.0%  10.1%  100.0% 
Monthly or just at 
holidays 
21.3%  17.7%  47.4%  13.6%  100.0% 
More rarely or 
never 
16.9%  17.0%  57.6%  8.6%  100.0% 
Residence           
Rural  37.0%  37.5%  21.0%  4.5%  100.0% 
Urban  32.7%  26.5%  33.7%  7.1%  100.0% 
Children           
Has children  22.5%  21.1%  42.4%  13.9%  100.0% 
No children  19.6%  17.5%  53.8%  9.1%  100.0% 
Household income  
(RON) 
NS, 
p>0.05 
       
Less than 900   18.9%  21.6%  47.8%  11.7%  100.0% 
901-1200  26.3%  19.4%  43.6%  10.7%  100.0% 
1201-1750  26.4%  17.2%  44.2%  12.2%  100.0% 
1751-3000  23.4%  17.3%  49.5%  9.8%  100.0% 
Above 3000  19.5%  13.8%  50.9%  15.7%  100.0%                       
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Socio-demographic 
characteristics 
Partisan 
Voters 
Pragmatic 
Voters 
Individualist 
Non-Voters 
Partisan 
Non-
Voters 
Total 
Employed in …           
Central/local 
government  
26.2%  16.8%  43.9%  13.1%  100.0% 
Other public sectors 
(e.g. education, 
health)  
26.0%  20.7%  44.7%  8.7%  100.0% 
State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs)  
30.5%  19.3%  40.3%  9.8%  100.0% 
Private companies   17.0%  15.7%  54.2%  13.1%  100.0% 
Their own 
businesses  
21.4%  14.3%  51.8%  12.5%  100.0% 
Other   14.3%  33.3%  46.0%  6.3%  100.0% 
Managerial position            
Yes  29.4%  14.1%  41.2%  15.3%  100.0% 
No  21.3%  18.6%  48.9%  11.2%  100.0% 
Trade unionist            
Yes  31.7%  15.7%  39.3%  13.3%  100.0% 
No  16.7%  19.1%  53.8%  10.3%  100.0% 
S/he has worked 
abroad for more 
than six months  
         
Yes  12.7%  5.5%  61.8%  20.0%  100.0% 
No  23.1%  19.1%  46.4%  11.4%  100.0% 
Note:  %  on  lines.  Variables  displayed  (except  education  and  household  income)  are  significantly 
associated with the types of voters / non-voters (p <0.01), but the effect size (Cramer's V coefficient 
<0.200) remains generally weak. 
Source: author's elaboration based on data ESS4, Romania (2008-2009). 
 
Explanatory models of political participation conventionally include both 
education  and  income  as  important  resources  for  political  activism.  The  ESS4 
post-electoral survey data reveal that neither formal education (measured here 
by the highest level of education completed by each respondent) nor income 
appear  to  be  significant  resources  for  participation,  at  least  not  for  electoral 
participation and for partisanship in Romania, 2008. 
The type of organization in which an individual is working is significantly 
associated with the type of participant/non-participant to whom s/he belongs. A 
first differentiation can be made between employees in the public and private 
sectors. But, as we shall see below, the two categories are also heterogeneous 
with  significant  differences  within  each  sector.  In  general,  public  sector  
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employees have higher levels of turnout and partisanship than those in the private 
sector. This could be explained by the fact that, in a highly politicized Romanian 
public sector, employees give greater relevance to elections, precisely because they 
more sharply perceive that their professional careers and their financial situation 
could  be  significantly  and  directly  influenced (in  good  or  bad)  by  the  decisions 
taken by the rulers, which win the elections. For example, the reduction or increase 
of wages, the layoffs or the levels of employment in the Romanian public sector are 
directly dependent on the political decisions of those that win election. Therefore, 
it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  public  sector  employees  compared  to  the  private 
sector ones could perceive the stakes of elections as more important. 
Moreover, significant differences exist not only between public and private 
sectors,  but  also  among public  sector  employees. Public  sector  employees  that 
usually receive negative media coverage for being highly politicized especially work 
in the public administration, where it is believed that ruling parties are hiring their 
"cronies" (generally as senior public servants). Data in Table 3 seem to contradict 
this  widely  held  view  among  the  Romanian  public.  The  group  of  citizens  that 
express the highest degree of electoral participation and political partisanship is 
not made up of civil servants but of those employed in state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Thus, among SOEs the share of partisan voters (30.5%) is higher compared 
to  other  public  sector  organizations  (i.e.  central  or  local  public  administration 
26.2%,  education  and  health  26%)  or  private  sector  organizations  (private 
companies 17%, own business 21,4%). In addition, employees of state enterprises 
generally vote in higher proportions than other categories of employees in the 
public or private sectors.  
How  can  one  explain  greater  levels  of  partisanship  and  electoral 
participation among employees of the state owned companies? The available data 
suggest  that  in  fact  the  bulk  of  party  "cronies"  is  not  employed  in  public 
administration, as is commonly believed, but precisely in state owned companies, 
where the wage level is higher and where political appointments are less visible to 
the media and the public. Therefore, the public discourse about de-politicization 
and  professionalization  of  public  administration  refers  only  to  one  side  (and 
perhaps not the most important) of the issue of politicized hiring in the public 
sector. In any case, the propensity of state enterprises employees’ to vote in higher 
proportions than employees in other sectors could be explained by different stakes 
which they attribute to winning elections by the party to which they feel close to.                       
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With  massive  politicized  hiring  in  state  owned  enterprises  (SOE),  winning  the 
election  by  the  party  they  feel  closest  equates  for  many  employees  of  state 
companies with keeping a well-paid job. On the other hand, losing the election by 
the party that controls public sector employment may precisely equate to job loss, 
probably according to the same political criteria on which employment has been 
acquired. 
Data  in  Table  3  also  suggest  that  those  holding  managerial  positions, 
whether working in the public or private sector, tend to be in greater proportions 
partisan voters compared to those who have no leadership positions. In fact, this is 
not so. Controlling for the employment organization reveals that the association 
between  the  types  of  voters/non-voters  and  holding  management  positions 
becomes statistically insignificant for employees in all types of organizations, with 
the  exception  of  employees  of  state-owned  companies,  where  the  relationship 
between variables remains significant *χ2 (3) = 12.61, p = 0.007, N = 407, Cramer's 
V coefficient = 0.173]. Therefore, based on currently available data we can only 
assert  that  in  state-owned  companies,  significant  differences  exist  between 
employees holding managerial positions and the rest of employees.  
The biggest differences among employees of state companies is noted with 
regard  to  the  partisan  voters  category:  48.3%  of  the  respondents  holding 
managerial  positions  are  voters  that  declare  closeness  to  a  political  party, 
compared to only 28% of those without managerial positions. Since the proximity 
to a political party might be a measure of political partisanship, the holders of the 
management  positions  in  state-owned  companies  display  a  greater  degree  of 
partisanship than other types of employees. This could be due to the fact that 
people close to parties, especially those who actually make their political clientele, 
are more often placed in management positions in SOEs rather than in subordinate 
positions. 
As it concerns those who have worked for more than 6 months abroad 
during  the  past  10  years,  the  data  in  Table  3  suggest  that  they  are  rather 
disconnected from the electoral process in Romania, at least for the 2008 elections. 
Thus, among those who had work experience in another country only 12.7% are 
partisan  voters,  5.5%  are  pragmatic  voters  and  over  81%  did  not  vote  in  the 
elections  of  November  2008  (61.8  %  are  individualist  non-voters,  while  20% 
partisan non-voters). 
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Conclusion 
 
In the last 20 years of democratic reconstruction in Romania, we can notice 
a general decline of turnout in parliamentary elections. Two of the main factors 
influencing this trend are political disaffection of a significant part of the citizenry, 
on the one hand, and an increasing stock of the Romanians working abroad, on the 
other hand. In sum, relatively few of the 2-3 millions of Romanian citizens working 
abroad can vote for the Romanian parliamentary elections in the host countries of 
residence  at  the  polling  stations  organized  by  the  Romanian  Foreign  Ministry. 
Instead,  most  of  them  need  to  return  to  Romania  to  vote  for  these  elections. 
Although they are included in the calculation of turnout, the costs of voting under 
these circumstances are prohibitive and most of the Romanians working abroad do 
not vote in the Romanian parliamentary elections.  
However, lower participation in the Romanian parliamentary elections of 
those who have worked abroad is associated not only with higher participation 
costs  but  also  with  less  interest  in  politics,  greater  mistrust  in  national  state 
institutions and especially distrust of politicians. It's very likely that many of those 
who have gone abroad to work have been of those disappointed with how things 
went during the transition period (i.e. the lack of well paid jobs to ensure a decent 
living, etc.). They are those who, in the wording of Comsa (2006), do not trust and 
do not expect a political solution to ensure the welfare for the many, thus trying to 
find their own alternative solutions and obtain higher standards of living outside 
the country (i.e. “Exit” strategy). 
Turnout  decrease  in  Romanian  parliamentary  elections  is  unevenly 
distributed on different areas of residence and this paper shows a persistent urban-
rural divide with higher rates of electoral participation in rural zones. In Romania, 
rural  dwellers  do  not  necessarily  participate  in  elections  and  display  higher 
attachments towards political parties because they are more interested in politics 
or  have more  political  expertise  than their  urban counterparts,  but  particularly 
because rural localities provide political organizations and leaders a better control 
over  local  electoral  contexts.  This  in  turn  has  an  effect  in  terms  of  political 
mobilization  strategies  for  parliamentary  elections  that  materialized  both  by  a 
higher rate of voter turnout and an increased level of political partisanship in rural 
areas.  
After  having  examined  the  trends  of  electoral  participation  in  post-
communist Romania, I have constructed a typology of voters/non-voters and then                       
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examined the evolution of the share of partisan and individualist/pragmatic voters 
from  1990  to  2008.  The  aggregated  partisanship  decrease  in  post-communist 
Romania follows a similar pattern with overall turnout decline in parliamentary 
elections, suggesting a link between the two. The association between partisanship 
and  electoral  participation  is  also confirmed  by  individual  level  analyses  (Tătar, 
2011c). However, turnout decline is unevenly distributed among different types of 
voters. The most dramatic downturn occurs in the case of partisan voters who 
represented 57% of the voting population in 1990, and only around 20% in 2008. 
The  percentage of  pragmatic-individualist  voters  (who  do  not  identify  with  any 
party) also decreased but not as dramatically: from 26.9% in 1990 to 18.8% in 2008. 
This raises questions about the credibility of the Romanian political parties and 
their ability to retain voters from one election round to another. On this track, the 
scope of this research can be furthered by an analysis of the stability of party 
attachments and their influence on electoral volatility.  
Beside  these  trends,  there  are  significant  attitudinal  and  socio-
demographic differences between partisan and non-partisan voters. In terms of 
political expertise, non-partisan voters (i.e. pragmatic voters) are not necessarily 
more politically sophisticated than partisan voters. On the contrary, partisanship 
seems to work: 1) as a way to reduce the costs for processing political information 
at the individual level; 2) as a means to express belonging to a group 3) as a means 
to strengthen the sentiment that individuals can exercise some degree of control 
over the political environment in which they live (political efficacy). All these 3 
functions of partisanship increase people’s “political saliency, that is, the relative 
importance citizens attach to politics” (Deth, 2006, p. 106). For example, data in 
Table 2 reveal that among those who feel close to a political party (whether voting 
or not) fewer are uninterested in politics and say they find it hard to decide on 
political issues, compared to those who are not partisans. In addition, among the 
partisan voters fewer believe that politics is complicated, compared to pragmatic 
voters. 
In contrast, individualist non-voters are often less interested in the political 
process,  believe  that  politics  is  a  complicated  activity  that  they  often  do  not 
understand, and consequently follow political news less or not at all. In the absence 
of relevant political knowledge and political party preference, individualist non-
voters  find  it  difficult  to  decide  when  it  comes  to  political  issues  in  general. 
Regarding  elections,  their  decision  is  not  to  participate.  Further  studies  might  
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better clarify the nexus between partisanship and political alienation, taking into 
consideration that in Romania individuals who do not feel closeness to any political 
party are usually characterized also by low political competence and lack of interest 
for politics (C. D. Tufiș, 2010).  
On a more general level, partisanship in Romania seems to be a variable 
endogenous to the political process which highly correlates with other political 
factors.  This  appears  to  contradict  the  initial  conception  of  party  identification 
(party ID) as “an exogenous variable affecting politics but not being affected by 
politics” (Holmberg, 2007, p. 563) set forth in The American Voter, while suggesting 
that partisanship in the new Eastern European democracies is mainly based on 
direct experience with post-communist politics and it is most probably negatively 
marked  by  the  political  disaffection  a  significant  part  of  the  post-communist 
citizenry might have felt during the transition period. This could be an explanation 
for  relatively  few  and  decreasing  numbers  of  party  identifiers  in  this  region. 
However, empirical analyses show that partisanship remains one of the significant 
factors  differentiating  between  voters  and  non-voters  (Tătar, 2011c)  suggesting 
that  decreasing  numbers  of  partisans  might  be  compensated  by  the  increasing 
intensity  of  their  attachment  to  political  parties.  Strong  party  identifiers  could 
constitute the "hard core" of an electoral body generally apathetic and pessimistic 
regarding the ability of elections to work as a mechanism that produces social and 
political  transformations,  after  experiencing  repeated  disappointments  with  the 
post-1989 governances (Tătar, 2011c).      
Education and income, two of the socio-economic status variables that are 
generally linked to electoral participation, especially in Western democracies, are 
not significantly associated with the types of voters/non-voters in Romania, at least 
not  in  the  case  of  the  parliamentary  elections  of  2008.  However,  other  socio-
demographical  variables  significantly  differentiate  between  various  types  of 
voters/non-voters. Thus, partisan voters tend to be in higher proportions: males, 
between 50-65 years old, married, residents of rural localities who attend religious 
services  at  least  weekly,  employed  in  state  owned  enterprises,  and  holding 
managerial positions. At the other extreme stand individualist non-voters who are 
usually: younger persons (age 18-29), unmarried, not attending religious services, 
urban dwellers without children, working in private enterprises, no trade unionists, 
working abroad for long periods of time. Particularly, residence and occupational 
status  seem  to  be  two  of  the  most  prominent  factors  shaping  partisanship  in                       
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general, and influencing the interaction between partisanship and voting behavior, 
in  particular.  Further  studies  should  elaborate  and  more  rigorously  test  these 
hypotheses not only for the case of Romania, but also in a comparative context. 
 
Notes 
1. This article elaborates on several parts of an unpublished chapter of the PhD 
thesis "Political Participation and Democracy in Romania after 1989" defended by 
the author at the University of Oradea in 2011. 
2.  A  more  detailed  and  multivariate  examination  (logistic  regression)  of  the 
predictors of electoral participation in Romania can be found in Tătar (2011c), a 
longitudinal  study  which  complements  the  bivariate  analyses  presented  in  this 
article. 
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